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Law and Anthropology: 









‘Anthropology’ is popularly defined as the examination of humankind - ‘the comparative 
study of cultural and social life’.2  It draws broadly upon other social and natural sciences, as 
well as humanities, and for this reason a ‘law and anthropology’ research methodology 
intersects somewhat with other approaches explored in this journal edition.  Yet this specific 
combination of perspectives has long occupied a key space in studies of ‘property’, for this is 
a concept that is central to both disciplines.  Law is, of course, deeply concerned with the 
distribution, regulation and protection of property in various forms.  And notions of property 
provide a crucial point of anthropological access to the broader values, systems and 
interrelationships of human societies.  The importance of the theoretical intersection has been 
greatly enhanced in recent years.  These two disciplines have, in a number of jurisdictions, 
been forced into a very public professional union in the context of Indigenous land claims. 
 
It should be emphasised, at the outset, that the ‘law and anthropology’ methodology is one 
that involves not simply the application of a less-used or deeper perspective to legal study, 
but rather a voyage across distinct disciplinary boundaries. That raises some particular 
challenges, just as the union has done in professional practice.  Not least of these is the need 
for caution in the handling of anthropological terms and concepts; this is a sophisticated and 
dynamic field of study that is an equal partner in the collaboration.  This writer is not an 
anthropologist, and one of the ultimate purposes of this article will be to remind fellow legal 
researchers that the old adage is applicable here: as anthropologists we make good lawyers. 
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 Yet the collaboration is a fascinating and maturing one in many countries.  This article begins 
with a brief review of the origins of this interdisciplinary conversation, and its broad ongoing 
relevance in various fields of property law.  The focus then turns to the way the collaboration 
works, academically and professionally, in the context of aboriginal (or ‘native’) title.  We 
will examine the some of the history of the union in this context, and illustrate its operation 
with respect to some key practical controversies.  Examples are chiefly drawn from the 
Australian context, however North-American and New Zealand comparisons will be added in 
particular places.   
 
In the context of Indigenous issues, the value of productive collaboration between law and 
anthropology is self-evident.  Few would deny the inherent limitations of traditional western 
legal method, left to its own devices, in its contemplation of sophisticated pre-existing 
Indigenous cultures.  Popular staging posts for critique here include the early decisions in the 
Canadian Delgamuukw dispute, Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1991) 79 DLR (4th) 185, 
and the Australian Yorta Yorta case, Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v 
Victoria [1998] FCA 1606.  However, a suitably simple starting point is a comment from the 
famous Maori lawyer, Sir ET Durie.  He once famously decried the stubborn 
‘monoculturalism’ of the courts when describing how a Maori elder’s song in a river bed 
claim was interpreted: ‘The court noted that he sang a song but had nothing to say’.3    
 
The academic heritage 
 
Many would trace the formal academic collaboration of law and anthropology back to the 
early 1900s - in particular the work of Malinowski.
4
  The law’s wandering self-examination, 
and advances in social science, had led to a deepening inquiry into the very nature of ‘law’ 
and whether it could be found in communities lacking the paraphernalia of western justice 
systems.
5
  Malinowski pressed for a broad understanding of ‘law’ – arguing that it was (albeit 
in differing forms) a universal characteristic of human society.  This was not the first 
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interrogation of legal principles and definitions by cross-cultural thinkers.
6
  In the late 1800s 
the early legal scholar Maine
7
 had been developing influential theories about the evolution of 
societies, with particular attention to issues such as whether ‘status’ or ‘contract’ was the 
source of obligations and privileges.  Around the same period Morgan
8
 was also producing 
theories of societal evolution – his work born of a fascination with the Iroquois in New York 
State and his broad-ranging studies of kinship systems.  Morgan had emphasised the 
centrality of ‘property’ in the evolution of societies. 
 
Malinowski’s contribution in the early 1900s was, however, of a different kind.  He bought to 
the academic debates what many regard as the first disciplined ethnographic study, via his 
fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands.  And the cross-disciplinary bridge was very clear from his 
firm focus on ‘law’ as the central concern of much of his study.  He left some important 
theoretical legacies - notably the ideas that reciprocity could be a dominant force giving ‘rise 
to the rights, obligations, and prohibitions that are the essence of civil law’,9 and that property 
law is not merely about the rights of individuals but also serves a social function in promoting 
such things as social cohesion and economic stability.
10
  While the subsequent years 
inevitably produced some telling critique of his particular theories, the centrality of 
ethnographic study (reinforced via the work of researchers such as Schapera
11
) has held firm.  
For some time such study was driven partly by the pursuit of colonial efficiency, and it has 
attracted controversy for this reason and because of the inherent problems with any attempted 
‘codification’ of living systems.12  However, ethnographic study has detached itself at least 
from its questionable early patronage, and is now central to the professional union of law and 
anthropology in important contexts such as Indigenous land claims. 
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 The concept of ‘property’ has long been a particular focus of the law / anthropology 
collaboration.  As noted early by Morgan and Maine in the late 1800s, and indeed by many 
others including Marx, concepts of property and ownership have played an enormous role in 
the organisation and operation of human societies.  Apart from its resulting attraction for 
philosophers, legal theorists, political scientists, social reformers and revolutionaries,
13
 it is 
necessarily a central interest of anthropology – as a window into the human condition.  There 
was for a time some focus on the commonalities of ‘property’ across cultures, but in recent 
decades the focus has shifted to the differences and the drivers of that difference (eg in the 
work of Appadurai).
14
  Anthropology has made some significant contributions to the cross-
disciplinary inquiry – eg by prompting expansion in our understanding of the very notion of 
‘property’, providing an accumulating body of ethnographic data, and explaining the role of 
property in the broader systems under examination.   
 
The academic collaboration between law and anthropology continues.  In addition to the 














  The collaboration has an important informative (and reformative) role 
as regards many specific aspects of property law – eg as to what can be ‘property’ (eg 
cultural knowledge?),
21
 who is capable of owning or inheriting property,
22
 the value and 
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transferability of property, the management of common property,
23
 and family entitlements to 
property.
24
  Perhaps its most critical contribution, however, is the space it opened for the 
recognition of Indigenous property rights in post-colonial societies.  Yet as will be seen, in 
that context the ongoing collaboration has been a troubled one.            
 
 
Why law and anthropology in the context of Indigenous land claims? 
 
Western property law was (and many would say still is) laden with anthropological 
assumptions; assumptions in respect of economics, family structures, social structures, 
religion, governmental systems, values, lifestyle, and life purposes.  It was a law designed 
(jurisprudentially and legislatively) for western existence.  This perhaps worked while the 
existence of ‘other’ land relationships (ie Indigenous ones) were ignored, denied or dealt with 
peremptorily by way of physical dispossession or treaty.  However, once the law determined 
that it would engage with such interests, its entrenched suppositions were inevitably tested.  
And engage it did.  Disconcertingly for the Australian observer, reported judicial recognition 
of inherent Aboriginal land entitlements dates back (at least) to 1823 in the US,
25
 1847 in 
New Zealand
26
 and 1888 in Canada.
27
  Australia surfaced in this respect only in the early 
1990s, but that is a story to which we will return. 
 
Initially the judicial recognition of these interests did not require the law to venture too 
deeply into the anthropological musings of the time (beyond recognising that there was an 
alternative to western land use norms).  The treaty or agreement-making process continued in 
North America – commonly involving the surrender of the Indigenous interests, the creation 
of a lesser reservation, and possibly the preservation of subsistence rights over surrendered 
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land that remained unoccupied.
28
  The early New Zealand response as regards specific 
territories was to embark upon an extensive process of statutory ‘conversion’ (identifying the 
correct owners of particular land and converting the interest into tradeable freehold).
29
  These 
approaches meant that there was, for many years, little call upon the law to engage with 
deeper anthropological questions.  Moreover, any early jurisprudential comment in these 
jurisdictions on the nature of the Aboriginal interest tended to represent it as a comprehensive 
one (that required little detailed cultural examination), and generally tended to rest its 
existence on basic notions of possession and occupation that were well-known to western 
law.
30
  There were exceptions to the law’s early disinterest in finer cultural details – for 
example in the application in New Zealand of the ‘1840 rule’.  The conversion process in 
New Zealand rested essentially upon an inquiry into titles under Maori ‘custom and usage’ as 
at 1840 (the time of entry into the Treaty of Waitangi and the assumption of nominal control 
by the British Crown).  The rule produced some controversial results owing (for example) to 
significant tribal movement around the 1840 period, and for this reason (and because of the 





Post-colonial law has gradually developed a greater interest in anthropological inquiries.  In 
its precise modern form it is more ready for such detailed inquiries, and of course it now 
approaches Indigenous claims armed with a more visible anthropological archive.  Moreover, 
the law is now working in the shadow of an established intellectual commitment to cultural 
preservation, and indeed with cognisance of resource pressures that might conceivably be 
eased by a more historicalised or ‘stylised’ approach to Indigenous interests.  Not 
surprisingly, the draw upon anthropology has been strongest in the last country to deal with 
Indigenous interests (Australia), and weakest in the country in which such matters were 
largely resolved by the 1970s (the US). 
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After the initial recognition of native title in Australia (in the 1992 Mabo decision: Mabo v 
Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1), and building in part upon habits formed under earlier 
statutory land rights methodologies,
32
 the Australian law quickly set to constructing a very 
microscoped approach to the determination and negotiation of claims.  It was determined that 
native title was to be defined according to the traditional (pre-sovereignty) laws and customs 
of the relevant group, and that its continued existence depended upon the survival of 
traditional laws and customs and traditional ‘connection’ with land.33  The courts struggled 
with subsequent arguments that an overly specific examination of the nature and survival of 
particular laws and customs would be too onerous for many claimant communities and fail to 
respect the true nature of Indigenous ties with land.
34
  Indeed the High Court reinforced the 
somewhat constricted methodology (with close attention to the terms of federal legislation) in 
two critical 2002 decisions
35
 - including via a stronger requirement that the Aboriginal 
‘normative system’ and ‘society’ must have survived the various historical intrusions.  
Inevitably the critique continued.  Most importantly however, given this judicial reasoning a 
considerable body of anthropological study (existing or created for particular claims) was 
squarely in play.  And the maturing law/anthropology collaboration was reinforced by the 
High Court’s broad shift in the early 2000s from an understanding that native title was a 
‘burden on Crown title’ to an insistence that it was an ‘intersection of systems’.36 
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(UQP, Brisbane, 1997) p 150; Myers GD, Piper CM and Rumley HE, “Asking the Minerals Question: 
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There are ironies in the constrictions of the Australian doctrine. By denying native title to 
communities most affected by historical intrusion,
37
 the western system in a sense benefits 
from its earlier disrespect for the interest.
38
  Moreover, native title processes themselves 
impact upon Aboriginal practices and beliefs - which are in turn a part of the laws and 
customs assessed for continuity.
39
  And it is noted by some that placing ‘tradition restrictions’ 
upon the content of native title simply perpetuates the disconnection of Aboriginal 





Such express historicalisation of the aboriginal title interest has been implicitly or expressly 
rejected in the other jurisdictions, at various points and by various means.
41
  However, some 
similar inquiries did find their way into the comparative jurisprudence in specific ways – eg 
in the dual attention to both physical occupation and Aboriginal ‘laws’ in the assessment of 
original occupation in Canadian title claims,
42
 also in Canadian ‘specific rights’ claims 
(which emerged first in the context of defences to fisheries prosecutions),
43
 and in the 
contemporary statutory foreshore claims regime in New Zealand.
44
  Not surprisingly, the 
controversies are stacked deeply in many of these contexts – some are discussed below.  
However, importantly for present purposes, it is clear that western property law’s engagement 
with native/aboriginal title issues is increasingly a deep foray into anthropology. 
 
To argue that the law has overzealously embraced anthropological histories is not to say that 
the basic collaboration should be undone.  After all, Australia’s own history is proof that it 
                                                          
37  For anthropological discussion of the supposed ‘settled’ versus ‘remote’ dichotomy see Macdonald G 
and Bauman T, “Concepts, Hegemony, and Analysis: Unsettling Native Title anthropology”,  in 
Bauman T and MacDonald G (eds), Unsettling Anthropology: The Demands of Native Title on Worn 
Concepts and Changing Lives (AIATSIS, Canberra, 2011)  p 1 ff.  
38  See Strelein L, “The Vagaries of Native Title: Partial Recognition of Aboriginal Law in the Alice 
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44  Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. 
must be pursued.  The Australian legal enlightenment in the 1992 Mabo decision was in 
many respects prompted by advancing anthropological understanding of Indigenous peoples 
and their relationships with land.
45
  The implications of this for legal research (theoretical or 
applied) are here to stay.  However, as we will see, perhaps a more functional 
interdisciplinary relationship can be forged. 
   
 
How do we engage with anthropological perspectives? 
 
We are chiefly engaged here with only one of the many interesting intersections between 
property law and anthropology.  The fact that this particular intersection operates at both 
academic and professional levels, and with a high public profile, means that the path for the 
cross-disciplinary researcher (or at least the beginning of the path) is well-marked.  Indeed 
there is little scope for contemporary engagement with Indigenous legal issues of any kind 
without attention to the historical, social, political and anthropological context.  Some might 
also add mention here of the inescapable importance of comparative study when working in 
the specific field of native title.  The focus here will remain with anthropology - the 
importance of attention to historical, socio-legal and comparative context in property law 
research are well covered in the accompanying articles in this journal edition.  However, it 
might be noted in the context of the case study examined in this article, for completeness, that 
comparative analysis has been particularly neglected in the field of Australian native title.
46
  
Some point to jurisdictional differences in the field to justify this, but it would seem that 
differences in the treatment of Indigenous peoples demand rather than preclude comparative 
study.
47
   
In the context of aboriginal or native title, the legal academic’s cross-disciplinary journey 
begins with the dynamic and complex land claim processes.   The contemporary claims tend 
to be replete with evidence from a large array of disciplines: eg history, linguistics, 
                                                          
45  See eg Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 104-7 (Deane and Gaudron JJ); Wik Peoples v 
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archaeology – and chiefly of course anthropology.48  The initial challenge for any reader is 
one of basic navigation.  Yet soon it becomes clear that the academic’s role in respect of this 
frantic professional assembly, most particularly the critical exchanges between law and 
anthropology, can be an important and multifaceted one.  The legal academic can venture into 
the anthropological issues and look back at the law with a new and more critical perspective.  
We can examine the inter-disciplinary interplay, question the accuracy and practicability of 
the law’s translations, and search for hidden drivers or conceptual inertias in the law’s 
responses and assumptions.  And indeed we can assess the law’s treatment of and impact 
upon this sophisticated contemporary science that has been pulled into our rigid legal 
frameworks and agendas.    
Aboriginal title or native title cases are frequently won or lost in court (or in negotiation) on 
the basis of the anthropological evidence.  And particularly in Australia, the relevant legal 
principles are in many ways shaped by anthropological understandings (albeit that the law’s 
translation in places is contested and/or evolving).  As noted earlier, at the heart of the 
interface in Australia is the law’s close attention to ‘traditional laws and customs’ – both in 
assessing whether native title has survived the ‘tide of history’,49 and in defining its content.  
Many of the component inquiries in this methodology heavily implicate anthropology,
50
 and 
many have attracted controversy.   
In the first place, the identification of the land holding unit (and appropriate claimant 
groupings) might be contested and can in itself unhinge a claim.
51
  There may also be a need 
for detailed inquiry into group membership (involving issues of relationship and decent).  
Secondly, there may be a need for examination of traditional decision-making processes and 
lines of authority – which are important to the legitimacy and efficacy of native title dispute 
resolution processes.  Thirdly, anthropology is heavily implicated in choosing the appropriate 
description of the rights and interests to be claimed.
52
  This has been a particularly 
contentious area, with some commentators suggesting that the restrictive Australian 
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Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 at [129] (first instance). 
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31; (2007) 238 ALR 1; Macdonald and Bauman, n 37; Dauth T, “Group Names and Native Title in 
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52  See in particular Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28; (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
methodology has too often unduly reduced the Indigenous land relationship to a fragile list of 
traditional activities.
53
  Fourthly, identification of relevant ‘law and custom’ itself carries 
some difficulty – there is a theoretical risk (albeit perhaps uncrystallised) that important 
traditional activities might lack the necessary normative or rule-like foundation.
54
  Fifthly, 
central to the whole process is an inquiry into continuity of ‘traditional law and custom’ and 
‘traditional connection’ in the face of change and interruption55 (which will include analysis 
of how present practices and knowledge draw from the past).  This has been the most 
contentious aspect of Australian native title jurisprudence, with some commentators 
suggesting the law suffers from a ‘museum’ mentality that disregards contemporary 
aboriginality and disadvantages the communities most affected by settlement.
56
  Finally, 
anthropology is heavily implicated in defining the relevant ‘society’ and ‘normative system’ 
and determining if they have survived.  Once again this is contentious, in part because of the 
meaning apparently attributed by the law to the notion of ‘society’.57 
Such matters have dominated the Australian native title scene. However, as noted above, the 
law-anthropology dialogue is not peculiar to Australia.  For example, Canada has a 
controversial test for the establishment of specific Aboriginal rights (eg in a defence to an 
environmental prosecution): in order to be an Aboriginal right (protected in recent years by 
s 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982), an activity must be an element of a practice, 
custom or tradition integral to the distinctive [pre-contact] culture of the Aboriginal group 
claiming the right.
58
  More recently in Canada there has been a much debated re-examination 
of the geographical scope of Aboriginal title (and the level of occupation required for its 
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establishment); the British Columbia Court of Appeal controversially declared in 2012 that 




As noted above, part of the role of legal academia is to examine the accuracy of the legal 
assumptions and translations involved here, and check for miscommunication, hidden drivers, 
inertias, impracticability etc.  Such examinations have produced a large body of influential 
critique on many of the issues listed above. 
 
 
Challenges in the collaboration 
There are challenges arising from the forced union of law and anthropology – two very 
different disciplines – in this field.  Some of these challenges are research-specific.  However, 
a suitable place to start is the nature of the professional interaction, which can be bruising for 
the anthropologist and sobering for the lawyer.  Academic researchers can benefit from some 
knowledge of the history here, and the Australian example is once again a stout illustration.   
Following the participation of Ronald Berndt and WEH Stanner as expert witnesses in the 
first assertion of aboriginal title in the Australian courts (the 1970s Milirrpum claim
60
 - a 
heavy failure), anthropology took on a long lead role in the ensuing statutory ‘land rights’ 
regimes.  A land rights scheme was established initially (and most importantly) in the 
Northern Territory, as a political response to the common law defeat, but variations spread to 
other apposite parts of the country (bar Western Australia).  The central Northern Territory 
scheme
61
 was defined around anthropological concepts (most particularly the notion of a 
‘traditional’ owner), and anthropologists played a central role in the formulation of claims 
and in the organisation and synthesis of other expert cultural and historical evidence.
62
   
Native title is often considered a difficult ‘second phase’ of the Australian anthropologists’ 
encounter with law; they are engaged here by a range of stakeholders (claimants, claimant 
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representative bodies, governments, industry groups etc.
63
), but have a more marginal role in 
claim design, work to less clearly-defined legal principles in this context, and have more 
direct exposure to formal adversarial proceedings.
64
     
Paul Burke from the Australian National University (highly qualified in both disciplines) 
wrote in his 2011 book Law’s Anthropology that:65  
The bodies of anthropologists, bruised from their encounter with native title, are to be 
found recuperating all around Australia.  Some, still wounded from humiliating cross-
examination, swear, yet again, never to be involved in another native title claim.  
While they lament their lack of influence, others warn of native title completely 
engulfing anthropology and ruining it. 
However, as Burke also acknowledged, some observers and participants in fact blame 
anthropology for the constrictions in legal doctrine. 
Clearly the relationship in practice, and hence the interplay to be examined by the academic 
researcher, is a complicated one.  There appear to be several factors at play here.  In the first 
place, anthropologists have been required to navigate some awkwardly conflicting 
expectations of their work.  On the one hand they have been subjected to post-colonial 
critique (particularly through the 1990s) that at its peak branded the discipline as antithetical 
to contemporary Indigenous interests.  Yet at the same time they have been carefully watched 
in legal contexts for signs of partiality towards (or advocacy for) Indigenous communities.
66
  
Such difficulties were exacerbated by the very public controversy and confusion surrounding 
the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case,
67
 which concerned in part an anthropologist’s handling 
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and acceptance of secret traditional knowledge in the context of an opposed bridge 
construction project.
68
   
A second broad factor at play in this troubled relationship is the point (as noted above) that 
these are very different disciplines, which results in some inevitable incongruity in their 
purposes, priorities, languages, protocols and processes.  There are some obvious issues here: 
law and litigation is a demanding and sometimes ruthless context in which to work,
69
 and 
indeed its awkward dynamism can require regular re-working of anthological study.
70
  
Burke has extracted from commentary a variety of explanations of this law-anthropology 
relationship.
71
  One theory is that it is a process of ‘digestion’: the law ‘converts anthropology 
into what it needs for its own functioning’- thus in a sense enslaving it.72  A second theory is 
that the relationship is one of ‘collusion’: judges look to a specific applied discipline such as 
anthropology to ‘share the burden of responsibility’ for difficult decisions.  A third is that the 
two professions compete over the ‘ownership’ of the social problem in issue.  This is perhaps 
evidenced by the fact that it has been common, particularly in the context of statutory land 
rights, to hear lawyers speak of their role in ‘briefing anthropologists’, while at the same time 
hearing anthropologists talk of ‘briefing lawyers’.  Elsewhere in his work Burke draws an 
interesting additional point from the broader work on interdisciplinary relationships by 
Bourdieu – noting that law’s position in academia turns upon its contribution to maintaining 
the temporal order, whereas sociology relies on its own ‘limitless ambition’ to explain all 
aspects of society (including law!).  Hence for an expert of the latter kind the act of appearing 




There is much here for the academic legal researcher to digest.  And they soon learn that one 
result of all this appears to be some quite significant miscommunication in the handling of the 
substantive issues.  As noted earlier, some commentators have directed blame to 
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anthropologists for the excessively microscoped and historicalised Australian legal doctrine.  
Certainly anthropology has provided the data.  However, anthropologists have often railed 
against the inquiries and conclusions asked of them, as well as the constrained legal 
interpretations of concepts such as ‘traditional’, ‘continuity’, and ‘connection’.74  It has been 
argued that the rigid legal framework can in important respects ‘foreclose on authentic 
anthropological understanding’.75  Clearly deeper communication is needed.76  And more 
broadly, some have pressed against the tightly defined roles assigned by the law – calling for 
anthropologists to push out into practical contemporary matters such as agreement making, 
governance and dispute management.
77
   
One explanation of the central story examined in this article is that the law in Australia has in 
some respects been asking the wrong questions of anthropologists, that the progeny of this 
collaboration is therefore in important respects a little gollumesque and destructive, and that 
now no one is quite sure where it came from.  At least the case for increasing cross-
disciplinary research is an easy one to make.   
There are a range of other challenges that arise in this field of study (orbiting the ones 
emphasised above).  An obvious one is that anthropology is highly complex.  There are 
complicated concepts (models of matrilineal and patrilineal decent are no place for the faint 
hearted) and even simple terms can have sophisticated meanings.  It is important to remember 
perhaps that our role as legal researchers is to draw upon rather than dabble in 
anthropological inquiry.  Another difficulty is that anthropological work in this field can at 
times be somewhat compartmentalised and isolated owing to it being not publically available 
(either for traditional secrecy reasons or contemporary legal reasons).
78
  And it must also be 
remembered that the anthropological archive (particularly earlier work) can be of variable 
quality and has been shaped to some extent by the predispositions, adopted paradigms and 
                                                          
74  See eg Macdonald and Bauman, n 37, p 3. 
75  Bauman, n 39, p 3; and see further Morton J, “Working With, For and Against the Act: Anti Anti-
Positivism and Native Title Anthropology” in Bauman T (ed), Dilemmas in Applied Native Title 
Anthropology in Australia (AIATSIS, Canberra, 2010) p 14.  See also Palmer K, ‘Anthropology and 
Applications for the Recognition of Native Title’ in (2007) 3(7) Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native 
Title (Issues Papers Series, AIATSIS); Burke, n 57; and generally Toussaint S (ed), Crossing 
Boundaries: Cultural, Legal, Historical and Practice Issues in Native Title (Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourne, 2004). 
76  See eg Trigger, n 66; Blackwood P, “Anthropological Expertise and Native Title: An Extract from an 
Expert Report to the Federal Court in the Waanyi Native Title Application” in Bauman T and 
MacDonald G (eds), Unsettling Anthropology: The Demands of Native Title on Worn Concepts and 
Changing Lives (AIATSIS, Canberra, 2011) p 161.  
77  Eg Morton, n 75.  
78  Macdonald and Bauman, n 37, p 3. 
purposes of its authors at the time.
79
  Care must be taken here as the legal use of data might 
perpetuate error or imprecision, and for this reason again legal researchers should be 
cognisant of the limited depth of their experience in this additional field.  Finally, it is 
important to not begin and end with anthropological collaboration.  Law and legal inquiry in 
Australia grievously neglected anthropology for a disreputably long time, but the rigorous 
conversation there now does not excuse us from creating space also for the many other 
disciplines implicated in native title claims: linguistics, archaeology, history etc.
80
  The law 




Ongoing anthropological study, and improved legal understanding of that study, are key 
ingredients in contemporary western legal development.
81
  The law must engage with 
systems and priorities not of its own making if it is to maintain its legitimacy in a post-
imperialist world.  Native title law, particularly in Australia, is one context where this is 
acutely important.  The professional dialogue here between law and anthropology has not 
been easy.  They are disciplines on different trajectories and the collaboration has been a 
tangled one.  Yet it is this collaboration that will drive reform and lasting settlements.
82
  
Academic researchers (from both disciplines) can very usefully examine the interplay; circle 
it, prod it and attempt to explain and improve it.  They can test the substantive results of the 
partnership.  And they can check the health of each of the partners.    
Research in this area is a fascinating challenge – not least because instinct perhaps tells us 
that these disciplines may never properly understand each other.  Anthropology contains 
decent measures of instinct, extrapolation, reflexivity, and celebrated uncertainty.  Yet the 
law contains healthy measures of pedigreed rigidity and protective scepticism.
83
  Justice 
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Vickers of the British Columbia Supreme Court perhaps had such a conundrum in mind when 
he commented (in the recent Tsilhqot’in claim in Canada):84         
I confess that early in this trial, perhaps in a moment of self-pity, I looked out at the 
legions of counsel and asked if someone would soon be standing up to admit that 
Tsilhqot’in people had been in the Claim Area for over 200 years, leaving the real 
question to be answered… [concerning] the consequences that would follow… I was 
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